


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# Western Europe Canada International Organizations

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## WESTERN EUROPE – CANADA – INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

### CONTENTS

25X1D



British Trade Minister Visits Cuba and Mexico . . . . .	3
Italy's Christian Democrats Still at Odds . . . . .	4

25X6



November 7, 1975

-i-

25X1D

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**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

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25X1A



British Trade Minister Visits Cuba  
and Mexico

Trade Minister Peter Shore begins a ten day visit to Mexico and Cuba today. The visits are generally aimed at increasing exports to these countries. The British are banking on an export led recovery to lead them out of recession and are leaving no stone unturned.

Cuba is the primary reason for the trip. Shore is responding to an invitation extended earlier this year by Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the top Cuban official responsible for foreign political and economic ties. The visit is the first by a British cabinet minister since Castro came to power and the Cubans will probably try to give it a political complexion. Britain, however, is essentially interested in expanding exports and specifically added the Mexican visit for political balance.

Trade between Britain and each of the two Latin American countries has been growing in recent years and the balance has been consistently in the UK's favor. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)

25X1A



November 7, 1975

25X1A



Italy's Christian Democrats Still at Odds

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Nearly five months after the Communist Party's sharp gains in nationwide regional and local elections, Italy's Christian Democrats are still far from agreement on how to prevent the Communists from repeating their success in scattered local elections this spring and in the 1977 parliamentary race.

In fact, the question of how to reverse the trend toward the Communists has tended to polarize the Christian Democrats into two camps. One group centers around Prime Minister Moro and interim party leader Zaccagnini and includes most of the party's traditional left wing as well as some centrists, like Foreign Minister Rumor, who have gravitated toward the left since the June elections. These Christian Democrats share the conviction that their party will have to shift its policies to the left and draw the Communists into a "competitive dialogue" in order to compete with them successfully at the polls. The Moro-Zaccagnini group wants to define the differences between the Christian Democrats and Communists in terms of tangible issues more than ideology, on the assumption that anti-communism per se has declining appeal for the country's discontented voters.

The opposing group appears somewhat stronger numerically and draws most of its support from the party right and the remainder of the traditional center. These leaders-including former Christian Democratic chief Fanfani, Budget Minister Andreotti and Defense Minister Forlani-believe that party policy should continue to center on the unanimous

November 7, 1975

“opposition” to the Communists expressed by the 1973 Christian Democratic congress. This group fears that, shifting the emphasis to a policy of “dialogue” with the Communists would only enhance their respectability and lead ultimately to broader collaboration with them.

The fact that advocates of the “dialogue” thesis now occupy the top posts in both the party and the government appears to be encouraging the centrists to try to substitute one of their own-Defense Minister Forlani is the frontrunner-for Zaccagnini as party leader. Zaccagnini was never a major contender for the top party post but agreed to take the job on a temporary basis three months ago when the Christian Democrats could not agree on a successor after ousting Fanfani.

Until recently, most Christian Democrats have agreed that Zaccagnini should remain at the helm until the yet-to-be-scheduled party congress, but some of Forlani's supporters seem to be urging him to advance his own candidacy when the Christian Democratic national council-the party's principal deliberative body-meets later this month. They maintain that the party needs more than a temporary leader as it prepares for the local elections this spring that will involve about a quarter of the voters.

Forlani is probably reluctant to risk deepening the divisions within the party by challenging Zaccagnini so soon. Although Forlani could probably command a majority in the national council if he forced a showdown now, he may be reluctant to risk an internal split similar to the one that complicated Christian Democratic preparations for the June elections. The party's leadership and policies would be opposed by its own left-wing at a time when the Christian Democrats' major task is to improve their standing with an electorate that is leaning increasingly toward the left.

November 7, 1975

Both the Socialists and Communists are watching the Christian Democratic internal struggle carefully. The Socialists are hoping that the Christian Democrats will eventually agree to an arrangement, such as formalized consultations with the Communists, that would limit the latters' ability to exploit discontent with unpopular government decisions. The provision for consultations is one of the conditions the Socialists placed on their renewed collaboration with the Christian Democrats in the national government.

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The Communists, for their part, are avoiding actions that could increase political uncertainties while they are attempting to consolidate their recent gains. This is best seen in the Communists' reluctance to challenge the fragile Moro government. The Communists recently hinted, for example, that they would abstain rather than vote against Moro in an upcoming parliamentary vote on the government's budget. (CONFIDENTIAL)



25X1A

November 7, 1975

25X6

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